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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a decision-maker who tries to learn the distribution of outcomes from
previously observed cases. For each observed sequence of cases, the decision-maker entertains
a set of priors expressing his hypotheses about the underlying probability distribution. The set
of probability distributions shrinks when new information conﬁrms old data. We impose a ver-
sion of the concatenation axiom introduced in BILLOT,G ILBOA,S AMET AND SCHMEIDLER
(2005) which insures that the sets of priors can be represented as a weighted sum of the ob-
served frequencies of cases. The weights are the uniquely determined similarities between the
observed cases and the case under investigation.
11 Introduction
How will existing information inﬂuence probabilistic beliefs? H o wd o e sd a t ae n t e rt h ei n d u c -
tive process of determining a prior probability distribution? KEYNES (1920) discussesingreat
detail the epistemic foundations of probability theory. In particular, in Part III of his "A Trea-
tise on Probability", he critically reviews most of the then existing inductive arguments for
this probability-generating process. One can view the approach of BILLOT,G ILBOA,S AMET
AND SCHMEIDLER (2005) as an attempt to model this inductive process with the concept of a
similarity function, covering both Bayesian and frequentist arguments.
The frequentist approach and the Bayesian belief-based approach to probability theory use
available information differently. Both approaches lead, however, to similar statistical results if
data is derived from statistical experiments, which are explicitly designed to obtain control over
the data-generating process. Classical examples are urn experiments where balls of different
colors are drawn from urns with unknown proportions of balls with different colors.
Statistical experiments represent an ideal method of data collection. In this case, decision mak-
ers can aggregate information directly in a probability distribution over unknown states. In-
deed, in this context, it is of little consequence whether one follows a frequentist or a Bayesian
approach. Both approaches will lead to the same probability distribution as more evidence
becomes available with an increasing database.
Inmostreal-lifedecisionproblems, however, decisionmakersdonothaveavailabledataderived
from explicitly designed experiments. Usually, they face the problem to predict the outcome
of an action based on sets of data which may be more or less adequate for the decision prob-
lem under consideration. Hence, decision makers must aggregate data which may be more or
less relevant for the unknown variable under consideration. The case-based decision-making
approach of GILBOA &S CHMEIDLER (2001) offers a systematic approach to this information
aggregation problem.
In a recent paper, BILLOT,G ILBOA,S AMET AND SCHMEIDLER (2005), henceforth BGSS
2(2005), show that, under few assumptions, a probability distribution over outcomes can be de-
rivedasasimilarity-weightedaverageofthefrequenciesofobservedcases. Moreover, GILBOA,
LIEBERMAN &S CHMEIDLER (2004) demonstrate how one can estimate the similarity weights
from a given database.
The case-based approach in BGSS (2005) associates a database with a single probabilitydistri-
bution. This appears reasonable if the database is large and if the cases recorded in the database
are clearly relevant for the decision problem under consideration. Indeed, BGSS (2005) note
also that this approach
"... might be unreasonable when the entire database is very small. Speciﬁcally, if there
is only one observation, [....] However, for large databases it may be acceptable to assign
zero probability to a state that has never been observed." (BGSS (2005), p. 1129)
In order to deal with this problem it appears desirable to choose an approach which allows us
to include some notion of ambiguity about the probability distribution associated with a given
database. For small and heterogeneous databases ambiguity may be large, while it may vanish
for large and homogeneous databases. The multiple-prior approach to decision-making offers a
framework which captures ambiguity about the probability distr i b u t i o nt ob eu s e df o rd e c i s i o n
making. One may think of the set of probability distributions as those probability distributions
the decision maker may not want to rule out, even given a most likely probability distribution.
For example, a decision maker may not trust the information that balls are drawn from an urn
with equal numbers of black and white balls. Based on a database consisting of three draws
resulting in one "black" and two "white" draws, the decision maker may be ambiguous about
whether the probability is 0.5 for the two colorso rw h e t h e rt h e r ei sah i g h e rp r o b a b i l i t yf o r
a "white" draw. This ambiguity may shrink as the database gets larger and one can be more
conﬁdent that the proportions of "black" and "white" draws reﬂect the actual probabilities.
Here we generalize the approach of BGSS (2005) such that it is possible to consider the weight
of increasing evidence. With a growing number of observations, i.e., with the length of the
database, decision makers may become more conﬁdent. Given a database, we will model am-
biguity about the most likely probability distribution by a set of probability distributions rather
3than a single probability distribution. We relax the main axiom of BGSS (2005), Concate-
nation to capture the idea that short data-sets provide ambiguous information about the actual
probability distribution of outcomes. At the same time, our modiﬁcation maintains the main
property of the representation derived in BGSS (2005), the uniqueness of the similarity func-
tion. In a next step, we further specify the representation. In particular, we assume that the
conﬁdence of the decision-maker increases as data accumulates and that the set of probability
distributions converges to the actual probability distribution when the data-set becomes very
long.
As in BGSS (2005), it remains an open question which decision criterion one should use for
choosing an action based on the available set of probability distributions over outcomes. The lit-
erature provides various decision criteria reﬂecting different degrees of optimism or pessimism
in the face of ambiguity. Combining a decision rule with the information processing procedure
described in this paper will be an issue of future research.
We view this paper as a ﬁrst step in a broader research agenda. The topic of this paper is the
relationship of ambiguity and similarity. In a second paper we will investigate the adjustment
of the similarity function in the light of new information. The main issue will be the criterion in
regard to which one wants to judge similarity. A third strand of research concerns the embed-
ding of these ideas in a behavioral model in the spirit of GILBOA,S CHMEIDLER &W AKKER
(2002).
2T h e M o d e l
The basic element of a database is a case which consists of an action taken and the outcome
observed together with information about characteristics which the decision maker considers
as relevant for the outcome.
We denote by X a set of characteristics,b yA as e to factions, and by R as e to foutcomes.A l l
three sets are assumed to be ﬁnite. A case c =( x;a;r) is an element of the ﬁnite set of cases
C = X × A × R.
4A database of length T is a sequence of cases indexed by t =1 ...T:
D =( ( x1;a1;r1),...,(xT;aT;rT)) ∈ C
T.
The set of all data-sets, denoted by D :=∪
T≥1
CT, is the set of databases of any length T ∈ Z+.
Consider a decision-maker with a given database of previously observed cases, D, who wants
to evaluate the uncertain outcome of an action a0 ∈ A given relevant information about the
environment described by the characteristics x0 ∈ X. We will assume that the decision-maker
associates a set of probability distributions over outcomes R,
H (D|x0;a0) ⊂ ∆
|R|−1,
with the action a0 in the situation characterized by x0 given the data base D ∈ D. Formally,
H : D×X × A→∆|R|−1 is a correspondence which maps D×X × A into compact and convex
subsets of ∆|R|−1.
We interpret H (D|x0;a0) as the set of probability distributions over outcomes which the deci-
sion maker takes into consideration given the database D. In applications one may think of this
set of probabilities as a neighborhood of the frequencies of relevant observations in D. With
such applications in mind, it appears reasonable to assume that H (D|x0;a0) is a compact and
convex subset of ∆|R|−1.Wewilldenote elements ofthis setbyh(D|x0;a0).Forthe probability
assigned to outcome r by the probability distribution h(D|x0;a0), we will write hr (D|x0;a0).
Notice that these probabilities over outcomes depend both on the action a0 and the charac-
teristics x0 of the situation under consideration. In this paper, we will focus on how a deci-
sion maker evaluates data in a given decision situation (x0,a 0). Hence, the decision situation
(x0,a 0) will mostly remainﬁxed. Fornotational convenience, we willtherefore often drop these
variables and write simply H(D), h(D) and hr(D) instead of H (D|x0;a0), h(D|x0;a0),a n d
hr (D|x0;a0), respectively.
2.1 Applications
The following examples illustrate the broad ﬁeld of applications for this framework. They will
also highlight the important role of the decision situation (x0,a 0).
5The ﬁrst example is borrowed from BGSS (2005).
Example 2.1 Medical treatment
A physician must choose a treatment a0 ∈ A for a patient. The patient is characterized by a set
of characteristics x0 ∈ X, e.g., blood pressure, temperature, age, medical history, etc. Observ-
ing the characteristics x0 the physician chooses a treatment a0 based on the assessment of the
probability distribution over outcomes r ∈ R.As e to fc a s e sD observed
1 in the past may serve
the physician in this assessment of probabilities over outcomes.
A case is a combinations of a patient t’s characteristics xt, treatment assigned at and outcome
realization rt recorded in the database D. Given the database D, the physician considers a set
of probabilities over outcomes, H (D|x0;a0) ⊂ ∆|R|−1, as possible. These probability distribu-
tions represent beliefs about the distribution of possible outcomes after choosing a treatment a0
for the patient with characteristics x0.
Ad i f f e r e n tﬁeld of applications are recommender systems which become increasingly popular
in internet trade. Internet shops often try to proﬁle their customers in order to provide them with
individually tailored recommendations. Our second example shows how an internet provider of
a movie rental system can be modelled with this approach.
Example 2.2 Recommender system of an internet movie rental shop
Consider a consumer who logs into the internet shop of a movie rental business. The customer
is associated with a set of characteristics x0 ∈ X which may be more or less detailed depending
on whether she is a new or a returning customer. The recommender system of the shop has to
choosewhichcategoryofmoviesa0 torecommendtothiscustomer. Theremaybemanydifferent
categories in an actual recommender system. In this example, we will distinguish, however, only
the genre of the movie and the most preferred language of the customer, i.e.,
A = {Comedy, Documentary, Romance}×{ English, German}.
1 The "observations" of cases are not restricted to personal experience. Published reports in scientiﬁc
journals, personal communications with colleagues and other sources of information may also provide
information about cases.
6The outcome of the recommendation could be whether rental agreement will result or not, r ∈
R = {success, no success}.
TherecommendersystemisbuiltonadatabaseD containingrecordsofcustomerswitha proﬁle
of characteristics xt who had been successfully offered a movie at ∈ A. Given this database
D the system assesses the likelihood H (D|x0;a0) of the customer x0 renting a movie from the
suggested category a0. The set of probability distributions over R, H (D|x0;a0), which are
taken into consideration reﬂects the degree of conﬁdence with respect to this customer. For a
new customer, conﬁdence may be low and the set of probabilities H (D|x0;a0) large. On the
other hand, if there are many observations for a returning customer in the database, the set
H (D|x0;a0) may be small, possibly even a singleton.
As a ﬁnal case we will consider a classic statistical experiment where the decision maker is
f a c e dw i t hd r a w i n g sf r o ma nu r n .
Example 2.3 Lotteries
Consider three urns with black and white balls. There may be different information about the
composition of black and white balls in these urns. For example, it may be known that
• there are 50 black and 50 white balls in urn 1,
• there are 100 black or white balls in urn 2,
• t h e r ei sa nunknown number of black and white balls in urn 3.
We will encode all such information in the number of the urn, x ∈ X = {1;2;3}.
In each period a ball is drawn from one of these urns. Agents can bet on the color of the ball
drawn, {B;W}. Assume that players know the urn x0 from which the ball is drawn, when they
place their bet a0. An action is, therefore, a choice of lottery a ∈ A := {1B0,1W0}, with the
obvious notation 1E0 for a lottery which yields r =1if E occurs and r =0otherwise.
Suppose players learn after each round of the lottery the result and the urn from which the ball
was drawn. Since there are only two bets possible a =1 B0 or a0 =1 W0 we can identify cases
c =( x,a,r) by the urn x and the color drawn B or W. Hence, there are only six cases
C = {(1,B),(1,W),(2,B),(2,W),(3,B),(3,W)}.
Suppose that, after T rounds, players have a database D = ((1,B),(3,W),...,(2,B)) ∈ CT.
With each database D, one can associate a set of probability distributions over the color of the
7ball drawn {B,W} or, equivalently, over the payouts {1,0} given a bet a. Suppose a decision
maker with the information of database D has placed the bet a0 =1 B0 and learns that a ball
will be drawn from urn 2, then he will evaluate the outcome of this bet based on the set of
probability distributions H (D|2;a0).
The set of probability distributions H (D|2;a0) should reﬂect both the decision maker’s infor-
mation given by the database D and the degree of conﬁdence held in this information. For
example, as in statistical experiments, the decision maker could use the relative frequencies
of B and W drawn from urn 2 in the database D and ignore all other observations in the
database. Depending on the number of observations of draws from urn 2, say T(2), recorded
in the database D of length T, the decision maker may feel more or less conﬁdent about the
accuracy of these relative frequencies. Such ambiguity could be expressed by a neighborhood
ε of the frequencies (fD(2,B),f D(2,W)) of black and white balls drawn from urn 2 according
to the records in the database D. The neighborhood may will depend on the number of relevant
observations T(2) = fD(2,B)+fD(2,W), e.g.,
H (D|2;a0)=
½









The set of probabilities over outcomes H (D|2;a0) may shrink with an increasing number of
relevant observations.
The last example illustrates how information in a database may be used and how one can model
ambiguity about the probability distributions over outcomes. In this example, we assumed that
the decision maker ignores all observations which do not relate to urn 2 directly. If there is
little information about draws from urn 2, howev e r ,ad e c i s i o nm a k e rm a ya l s ow a n tt oc o n s i d e r
evidence from urn 1 and urn 3, possibly with weights reﬂecting the fact that these cases as less
relevant for a draw from urn 2
2.
In the following sections, we will take the decision situation (x0,a 0) as given. We will relate
2 Part III of KEYNES (1921) provides an extensive review of the literature on induction from cases
to probabilities.
8the frequencies of cases in a database D,
fD (c): =
|{ct ∈ D | ct = c}|
|D|
,
to sets of probabilities over outcomes H(D|x0,a 0). We will impose axioms on the set of prob-




c∈D s(c|x0,a 0)fD (c)hc P
c∈D s(c|x0,a 0)fD (c)





|D| denotes a database of length |D| containing only case c.
The weighting function s(c|x0,a 0) represents the perceived similarity between the case c and
the current situation (x0,a 0). It indicates how relevant a case c is with respect to the decision
situation (x0,a 0). The set of probability distributions over outcomes H((c)
|D| |x0,a 0) is the set
of probability distributions over outcomes entertained by the decision maker in case of a data
set consisting only of observations of the same case c. The axioms suggested below will imply
(up to a normalization) unique similarity weights s(c|x0,a 0) and unique sets of probability
distributions H((c)
|D| |x0,a 0). This result generalizes the main theorem of BGSS (2005) to
t h ec a s eo fm u l t i p l ep r i o r s .
It appears natural to assume that a decision maker with a database consisting only of obser-
vations of the same case c =( x,a,r) will at least consider the possibility that the outcome r
occurs with probability 1 in the decision situation (x,a), i.e., that the r-th unit vector er ∈ R|R|
is contained in the set H((x0,a 0,r)
|D| |x0,a 0). Moreover, conﬁrming evidence should increase






3 Axioms and Representation
In this section, we will take the decision situation (x0,a 0) as given and will suppress notational
reference to it. It is important to keep in mind, however, that all statements of axioms and
9conclusions do depend on the relevant reference situation (x0,a 0). In particular, the similarity
weights, which will be deduced below, measure similarity of cases relative to this reference
situation.
In order to characterize the mapping H(D) we will impose axioms which specify how beliefs
over outcomes change in response to additional information. In general, it is possible that the
order in which data becomes available conveys important information. We will abstract here
from this possibility and assume that only the data matters for the probability distributions over
outcomes.














A c c o r d i n gt oA x i o m(A1) the order of cases in a database D =( ct)
T
t=1 is irrelevant. The set of
probability distributions over outcomes is invariant with respect to the sequence in which data.
Hence, each database D is uniquely characterized by the tuple (fD;|D|),w h e r efD ∈ ∆|C|−1
denotes the vector of frequencies of the cases c ∈ C in the data-set D and |D| the length of the
database.
In line with BGSS (2005), we call the combination of two databases a concatenation.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Concatenation
For any two databases D =( ct)
T















is called the concatenation of D and D0.
The following notational conventions are useful.
Notation By Axiom (A1) a concatenation is a commutative operation on databases. Hence,
we will write Dk = D ◦ ... ◦ D | {z }
k-times
for k concatenations of the same database D. In particular, a
database consisting of k-times the same case c can be written as (c)
k .
Imposing the following Concatenation Axiom, BGSS (2005) obtain a characterization of a
function h mapping D into a single probability distribution over outcomes.
Axiom(BGSS 2005)Concatenation For every D, D0 ∈ D,h (D ◦ D0)=λh(D)+( 1−
λ)h(D0) for some λ ∈ (0,1).
10The Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005) implies that, for any k, the databases D and Dk
map into the same probability distribution over outcomes, h(D)=h(Dk). Hence, two data-sets
D =( c) and D0 =( c)
10000 will be regarded as equivalent. This seems counterintuitive.
Ten thousand observations of the same case c =( x,a,r) are likely to provide stronger evi-
dence for the outcome r in situation (x,a) than a single observation. Arguably, the database
(c)
10000 provides strong evidence for a probability distribution concentrated on the outcome r,
h((c)





ciated with the database (c)
10000 . Based on a single observation (x,a,r), however, it appears
quite reasonable to consider a set of probability distributions H((c)) which contains also prob-
ability distributions h((c)) with hr0 ((c)) ∈ (0,1) for all r0. In particular, based on the database
D =( c), a decision maker may not be willing to exclud et h ec a s eo fa l lo u t c omes being equally
probable, i.e., h(D) with hr0(D)= 1
|R| for all r0 ∈ R. It appears perfectly reasonable to include





We would like to model decision problems where decision makers may become more conﬁdent
about their beliefs as they observe databases with the same frequency distribution of cases
but increasing numbers of cases. Hence, we cannot simply apply the Concatenation Axiom
of BGSS (2005) to all probability distributions in the mapping H. Restricting the axiom to
databases with equal length will provide sufﬁcient ﬂexibility for our purpose.
Denote by DT := CT the set of databases of length T Recall that the convex combination of
two sets H and H0 is deﬁned by
λH +( 1− λ)H
0 = {λh +( 1− λh
0) | h ∈ H and h
0 ∈ H
0}.
Axiom A2 Concatenation Consider a data set F ∈ DT and, for some n ∈ Z+,l e tD1...Dn
∈ DT be such that D1 ◦ ... ◦ Dn = Fn. Then, there exists a vector (λ1...λn−1) ∈ int(∆n−1)





























11Note that F3 can be represented as concatenation of D1 =( c1)
3 and D2 = D3 =( e2)
3:
F
3 = D1 ◦ D2 ◦ D3 = D1 ◦ D
2
2.
(A2) then asserts the existence of λ1 and λ2 such that:
λ1H (D1)+λ2H (D2)+( 1− λ1 − λ2)H (D3)=H (F).
It should be clear that each data-set can be represented as a concatenation by choosing n and
the data-sets (Di)
n
i=1 in an appropriate way (e.g. by choosing the basis of the space DT,w i t h
Di =( ci)
T) and that the representation is in general non-unique.
In spirit, Axiom (A2) is very similar to the Concatenation Axiom introduced by BGSS (2005).
The main difference is that we restrict the axiom to data sets of equal length. Restricted to the
set DT, (A2) has the following implication: if the evidence of each of the n data-sets of equal
length D1...Dn suggests that a given outcome r is possible, i.e. for all i ∈ {1...n},
hr (Di) > 0 for some h ∈ H (Di)
then r must be considered possible under the data-set F,i . e .
hr (F) > 0 for some h ∈ H (F)
resulting from the concatenation of these data-sets, while controlling for the length of the data-
set.
The restriction to sets of equal length is important for our approach since databases of different
length may give rise to different degrees of conﬁdence. To see this, consider the databases D
and D2 = D ◦ D. Since the database D2 contains twice the number of cases in database D,
i ta p p e a r sr e a s o n a b l et oa s s u m et h a tt he decision maker should be more conﬁdent to make a
prediction based on the bigger database D2 than on D. In other words, it might be that D does
not contain enough observations to exclude the possibility of a given outcome r,i . e .h(r) > 0
for some h ∈ H (D), whereas the data-set D2 is sufﬁciently long to imply hr (D2)=0for all
h ∈ H (D2). Applying the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005), we would conclude that





= H (D ◦ D)=λH(D)+( 1− λ)H(D)=H (D),
12which seems counterintuitive in this context. Thus, imposing BGSS (2005)’s Concatenation
Axiom, the set of probability distributions over outcomes would necessarily be independent
of the number of observations. Our weaker Axiom (A2), however, implies in this case only
λH (D)+( 1− λ)H (D)=H (D).
Remark 3.1 Note that Axiom (A2) requires the weights λ to be constant across different T’s,
as long as the frequencies of the data-sets entering the concatenation remain unchanged. This
assumption is crucial for our result that the similarity function is uniquely determined. In
particular, we can construct the similarity function for a speciﬁc class of data-sets contain-
ing inﬁnitely many observations by using the methods of BGSS (2005) and then, using this
assumption, extend the representation to all ﬁnite data-sets.
Similar to BGSS (2005), we have to impose a linear-independence condition on the sets prob-
ability distributions over outcomes H (D).





isﬁes the following condition:
















































As an example of sets H (D) satisfying Axiom (A4) consider the case of |C| = |R| =3 .I n






represents a conﬁdence interval around the actually realized frequency of outcomes,
e1 =( 1 ,0,0), e2 =( 0 ,1,0) and e3 =( 0 ,0,1). Then, these sets will satisfy the requirement of
Axiom (A3), see Figure 1.
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1. Non-collinear sets of priors
The following theorem guarantees a unique similarity function for data sets of arbitrary length.
Theorem 3.1 Let H be a correspondence H : D → ∆|R|−1 t h ei m a g e so fw h i c ha r en o n - e m p t y
convex and compact sets. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) H satisﬁes the Axioms Invariance, Concatenation, and Linear Independence for every
T.
(ii) There exists a function
s : C → R++
and, for each T ∈ Z+, T ≥ 2, there exists a correspondence, satisfying Linear Independence,
ˆ PT : C → ∆
|R|−1
such that for any D ∈ DT
H (D)=
½P
c∈C s(c)ˆ pT (c)fD (c)
P
c∈C s(c)fD (c)
| ˆ pT (c) ∈ ˆ PT (c)
¾
.
Moreover, for each T, ˆ PT is unique and s is unique up to a multiplication by a positive number.
Note how the different axioms enter this representation. (A1) insures that the only relevant
characteristics of a data-set D are the generated frequencies (fD (c))c∈C and its length T.W e
then use (A2) and (A3) to show that for a class of databases with inﬁnite length, we can rep-
resent H (D) as a union of functions h(D) which satisfy the axioms of BGSS (2005). This
class of data-sets can be characterized by its frequencies, which are dense in the simplex of di-
mension |C|−1. Hence, we can apply Proposition 3 of BGSS (2005) to every selection h(D)
in order to demonstrate the existence of a unique (up to a multiplication by a positive constant)
14similarity function s and unique probabilities ˆ p. Axiom (A2) then implies that the same values
of s can be used for every T<∞.
The following example of a correspondence H will illustrate the result.
3.1 Leading example
Consider a doctor who has to choose one of two treatments, a ∈ A = {a1,a 2}. In past treat-
ments, one has recorded only two characteristics of patients, high blood pressure, xh, or low
bloodpressure, xl. Hence, thesetofpotentiallycase-relevantdatacomprisesx ∈ X = {xh,x l}.
Finally, three outcomes of the treatment have been registered, say r1, success, r2, no effect, and
r3, failure, i.e., R = {r1,r 2,r 3}.
In this case, databases D of any length |D| will be made up of the following twelve cases:
c1 =( x1,a 1,r 1)
c2 =( x1,a1,r 2)
c3 =( x1,a 1,r 3)
c4 =( x1,a 2,r 1)
c5 =( x1,a 2,r 2)
c6 =( x1,a 2,r 3)
c7 =( x2,a 1,r 1)
c8 =( x2,a1,r 2)
c9 =( x2,a 1,r 3)
c10 =( x2,a 2,r 1)
c11 =( x2,a 2,r 2)
c12 =( x2,a 2,r 3)
Recallthat, withoutanyloss of generality, wecanreplaceanydatabaseD with (fD,|D|).Hence,
one can write (ei,T) for a database D =( ci)
T , which contains T-times the case ci. For each
T a n de a c hu n i tv e c t o rei ∈ R|C|−1 = R11, consider the following sets of probabilities over
outcomes,
ˆ PT(ei): ={p ∈ ∆2| p1 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i =1 ,4,7,10,
ˆ PT(ei): ={p ∈ ∆2| p2 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i =2 ,5,8,11,
ˆ PT(ei): ={p ∈ ∆2| p3 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i =3 ,6,9,12
for some ε > 0.
This assignment of probabilities over outcomes can be given the following interpretation. An
intuitive way would be to assign probability distributions to databases would be as follows.
Databases with constant (x,a) provide a controlled experiment about the probabilities over
outcomes, e.g., a database made up only of cases c1,c 2 and c3 would generate a frequency
on R which might serve as an estimate for the probabilities on R. If there is some ambiguity
ε about this estimate, which appears natural if there are few observations, one may assume
15that this ambiguity decrease as the number of conﬁrming observations T rises. In particular,
databases containing only a single case (x,a,r) may have the probability distribution yielding
the outcome r with probability 1 as a natural ﬁrst estimate. Note also that the ˆ PT(ei) satisfy
Linear independence (Axiom (A3)).
We will assume ﬁxed similarity weights (s1,...,s12) for the twelve basic cases. For an arbitrary
database D of length T with a frequencies of cases fD one obtains the following set H(fD,T)
of probability distributions:











,h i ∈ ˆ PT(ei),i=1 ,...,12}.
4 Similarity
The similarity weights s(ci) of Theorem 3.1 have to be seen in relation to the decision situa-
tion (x0;a0) under consideration. The notation s(c|x0,a 0) emphasizes this relationship. If a
decision situation (x0,a 0) is part of the cases considered in C, then there are cases (x0;a0,r)
in C w h i c ha r ed i s t i n g u i s h e do n l yb yt h eo u t c o m e s . In this case, it appears natural to assign
the highest degree of similarity to these cases. There are decision situations which are com-
pletely speciﬁed in the sense that all relevant aspects of the situation are included in the data
x collected, as in Example 2.3. In such cases, one may be willing to assign similarity weights
of zero to all cases with different data. This appears as an extreme case, which may obtain
in experimental situations in statistics and physics. Even in those applications, there may be
insufﬁcient observations. A lack of the desired data may make it sensible to consider data from
similar, but not exactly equal situations. Hence, one may want to include cases with data from
similar situations with lower similarity weights s(c|x0,a 0).
In general, however, decision makers will be uncertain about which data will be important for
the outcome. Such cases are described in the Examples 2.1 and 2.2. In these cases, it may
be reasonable to consider also cases in C which do not exactly match the decision situation
(x0;a0), but may be relevant given the lack of information about the data which determines
16the outcomes. In Example 2.2, there is data about a customer’s choice of movie from a set of
categories and languages. If the decision problem is to make a recommendation to a customer,
i tm a yb er e a s o n a b l et og i v es o m ew e i g h tt om o v ies from the category and language which the
customer has chosen in the past, but one may also want to consider other cases where customers
maybe from the same language group bought other categories.
The following example will illustrate such a procedure for a variation of Example 2.1.
Example 4.1 Consider a medical doctor who has to choose one of two treatments, a ∈ A =
{a1,a 2}. In past treatments one has recorded only three characteristics of patients, high blood
pressure, xh, normal blood pressure, xm, or low blood pressure, xl. Hence, the set of potentially
case-relevant data comprises also x ∈ X = {xh,x m,x l}. F i n a l l y ,t h r e eo u t c o m e so ft h et r e a t -
ment have been registered, say r1, success, r2, no effect, and r3, failure, i.e., R = {r1,r 2,r 3}.
In this case, databases D of any length |D| will be made up of the following eighteen cases:
c1 =( xl,a 1,r 1)
c2 =( xl,a 1,r 2)
c3 =( xl,a 1,r 3)
c4 =( xl,a 2,r 1)
c5 =( xl,a 2,r 2)
c6 =( xl,a 2,r 3)
c7 =( xm,a 1,r 1)
c8 =( xm,a 1,r 2)
c9 =( xm,a 1,r 3)
c10 =( xm,a 2,r 1)
c11 =( xm,a 2,r 2)
c12 =( xm,a 2,r 3)
c13 =( xh,a 1,r 1)
c14 =( xh,a 1,r 2)
c15 =( xh,a 1,r 3)
c16 =( xh,a 2,r 1)
c17 =( xh,a 2,r 2)
c18 =( xh,a 2,r 3)
A n a l o g o u s l yt oE x a m p l e3 . 1( a n dw i t has i m i l a ri nterpretation in mind), we can construct the
sets of probability distributions ˆ PT(ei) in the following way.
ˆ PT(ei): ={p ∈ ∆2| p1 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i =1 ,4,7,10,13,16
ˆ PT(ei): ={p ∈ ∆2| p2 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i =2 ,5,8,11,14,17
ˆ PT(ei): ={p ∈ ∆2| p3 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i =3 ,6,9,12,15,18
for some ε > 0.
Assuming ﬁxed similarity weights (s1,...,s18) for the eighteen basic cases, we arrive at the
representation:











,h i ∈ ˆ PT(ei),i=1 ,...,18}.
Figure 2 illustrates this procedure. Disregarding ambiguity for the sake of the argument, let us
assume for a moment that ˆ PT(ei)={ei} for i =1 ,...,18.
Similarity weights have to be interpreted in relation to a given situation (x0,a 0) of which the
probability over results has to be assessed. If there are cases in C which are characterized by
the same (x0,a 0) a similarity relation among the basic cases in C can be established.
E.g., suppose that the problem under consideration is characterized by (xh,a 2). Then it appears
natural to assign a similarity weight of one to the cases {c16,c 17,c 18} which are identical and
differentiated only by the outcome. If one were to adhere strictly to the same type of cases, then
one may want to put all other similarity weights to zero, leaving us with the relative frequencies
















For large data-sets D with many observations of cases c16,c 17,c 18 this may be a reasonable
procedure. It may well be, however, that D contains few or no observations of cases with
high blood pressure, in which treatment a2 has been prescribed. Then one may reasonably take
into account cases which are not identical test cases but arguably relevant. E.g., one could
presume that a patient with normal blood pressure is more similar to a patient with high blood
pressure than a patient with low blood pressure. Hence, the similarity of cases with normal
blood pressure may be smaller than the similarity of cases with high blood pressure, but higher

























































ˆ PT (ei),i=1 , 4, 7, 10




2. Constructing hypotheses using similarity weights
I nt h i sp a p e rw ea s s u m et h a ts i m i l a r i t yw e i g h t sf o rag i v e nr e f e r e n c ec a s ea r ei n d e p e n d e n to f
t h ea m o u n to fd a t ai nD. This assumption appears, however, questionable if one views the per-
ception of similarity as an imperfect substitute for knowledge about the relevance of underlying
data. This is an issue we will deal with in a companion paper, EICHBERGER &G UERDJIKOVA
(2007).
The main focus of thes paper is ambiguity in the context of case-based predictions of probabil-
18ities over outcomes. If a decision maker has to consider cases of different degrees of similarity
then it appears natural to assume that a decision maker feels ambiguous about the predicted
probability distribution over outcomes. There are several ways to model ambiguity among them
the multiple prior approach introduced by GILBOA &S CHMEIDLER (1989). In the spirit of
this paper, we model ambiguity by a set of probability distributions over outcomes. The degree
of ambiguity will be measured by set inclusion. The smaller the set of probability distributions
over outcomes, the less ambiguous the prediction.




for all i. Moreover, ˆ PT(ei) ⊂ ˆ PT−1(ei) for all i.These assumption seems quite natural in the
context of controlled experiments. The ﬁrst one says that ambiguity decreases with "more
information" in the sense of "more cases with the same outcome". The second one implies that
as the same outcome is observed over and over again, its perceived probability converges to 1.
In the next section, we provide axioms which capture this intuition and analyse their implication
for the perception of similarity.
5 Learnability and conﬁdence
In this section, we focus on a decision-maker who tries to learn the properties of statistical
experiments as in Example 2.3 in the previous section. Learning a probability distribution is
meaningful only if we assume stationarity and ergodicity of the underlying random process ac-
cording to which the outcome is generated. The learning process of the decision-maker consists
in formulating a set of probability distributions over outcomes, describing the likelihood of out-
come r g i v e nac o m b i n a t i o no fa no b s e r v e ds i g n a lx a n da na c t i o na.I n t h e t r i v i a l c a s e o f a
repeated experiment, i.e. (x,a) is constant, the set of probability distributions over outcomes is
assumed to contain the actually observed frequencies. The size of the set of probability distri-
butions over outcomes can be taken to reﬂect the conﬁdence of the decision maker with respect
to the data. Given our assumption of ergodicity, as the data set becomes larger, the conﬁdence
19of the decision-maker increases until (with an inﬁnite number of observations), the set of proba-
bility distributions reduces to a singleton. Moreover, if the assumption of ergodicity is satisﬁed
and D =( ( x,a,rt))
∞
t=1, then, according to the Ergodic Theorem, DURETT (2005, P. 337), the
frequencies of r a.s. converge to a probability distribution f (r)which exactly corresponds to
the actual probability distribution of r given (x,a):
lim
T→∞





Of course, it is easy to think of examples in which the ergodicity property would not be satis-
ﬁed. E.g. the sequence of observations (x;a;1);(x;a;2)...(x;a;100)...(x;a;200)... does not
have the ergodicity property. Learning from thiss e q u e n c ew o u l dh a v eac o m p l e t e l yd i f f e r e n t
character than the one incorporated in our axioms.
This motivates the assumption of Learnability w h i c hw em a k eb e l o w . W ea s s u m et h a tt h e
following axioms specify the rules by which the decision-maker forms hypotheses.








As T →∞ ,
H (D) → {h(D)}
with
hr (D)=fD (r).
According to Axiom (A4), the decision maker can learn the unknown proportion of the colors
in a urn, as in Example 2.3. If draws from the urn are with replacement, then the decision-maker
will eventually learn the true composition of the urn after observing the outcome of an inﬁnite
number of draws.
Finally, we will assume that a decision maker’s conﬁdence in the observed frequencies of cases
grows with a growing number of observations.
Axiom (A5) Accumulation of knowledge Let D and D0 be two ﬁnite data-sets with common
(x,a) such that fD = fD0 and |D0| > |D|, then
H (D
0) ⊂ H(D).
Axiom (A5) captures the idea that the ambiguity of the decision-maker about the true proba-
bility distribution of r decreases as the number of observations increases in a controlled experi-
20ment, i.e., for ﬁxed (x,a). Notice that Axiom (A5) applies only to data-sets in which frequen-
ciesareidentical. Iffrequenciesdiffer,asmallersetmightbemorereliablethanalargerone. For
example, D ∈ D100 with fD (x;a;r1)= 99
100 and fD (x;a;r2)= 1
100 will in general constitute
stronger support for h(r1|x;a)= 99
100 than D0 ∈ D200 with fD0 (x;a;r1)=fD0 (x;a;r2)=1
2.
Note that (A5) does not tell us in which way the set of probabilities over outcomes shrinks.
Together with the Invariance Axiom (Axiom (A1)), Axioms (A4) and (A5) imply that the
observed frequency of outcomes in a controlled experiment is always contained in the set of
probabilities over outcomes which the decision maker considers.
Lemma 5.1 Assume (A1), (A4) and (A5) hold, then for any database D of length T with ﬁxed
(x,a), i.e., D =( ( x;a;rt)
T
t=1), there is an h ∈ H (D) such that
hr (D)=fD (r)
for all r ∈ R.
Finally, we prove that together with the representation derived in Theorem 3.1, Axioms (A4)
and(A5)implytwointuitivepropertiesoftherepresentationofH(D). First, thesets ˆ PT (x;a;r)
shrink with time, always contain the r-th unit vector er and converge to er as T converges to
inﬁnity. Second, for a given tuple (x;a), the similarity function assigns a value of 1 ( u pt oan o r -
malization) to all cases (x;a;r0) with r0 ∈ R. Hence, as long as the conditions under which the
experiment is conducted remain constant, all outcomes of the experiment are equally relevant
for the assessment of probabilities.
Theorem 5.2 Suppose Axioms (A4) and (A5) hold and consider databases D with ﬁxed
(x,a), then the representation H(D) in Theorem 3.1 satisﬁes the following additional prop-
erties:
1. ˆ PT satisﬁes for all r ∈ R and every T,
(i) ˆ PT ((x,a,r)) ⊂ ˆ PT−1 ((x,a,r)),
(ii) er ∈ ˆ PT ((x,a;r)), and
(iii) lim
T→∞
ˆ PT ((x;a;r)) = {er}.
2. s((x,a;r)) = 1 for every r ∈ R.
216 Concluding remarks
We have generalized the approach of BGSS (2005) to understand the inﬂuence of ambiguity
on a decision maker’s prediction about the probability distribution of outcomes. We relax the
Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005) by restricting it to data-bases of equal length. We
show that the main result of BGSS (2005), namely that the similarity function is unique, holds
as long as we impose some consistency on the weights λ across different values of T.T h i s
consistency is essential for the uniqueness result. Relaxing this assumption would require the
similarity function to be determined separately for each value of T, i.e. for each set DT.A sa
result, for T<∞, different similarity functions would be used to evaluate different data-sets D.
Along the sequence DTm with Tm = m!, the set of similarity functions will shrink, approaching
a single point in the limit as m →∞ .
As a special case of our approach we consider predictions associated with homogenous data-
sets. Homogenous data-sets can be interpreted as controlled statistical experiments, hence the
idea that ambiguity decreases as new data conﬁrms past evidence appears very natural. Com-
binedwiththeassumptionthatinthelimit, thedecision-maker learnstheprobabilitydistribution
generatingthe process, we arrive at the conclusion that the notion of similarity in such situations
is trivial. In particular, all observations are considered equally importantf o rt h ep r e d i c t i o nt o
be made.
Although statistical experiments can serve as an illustration of our approach, we do not consider
them to be the ideal ﬁeld for the application of the concept of similarity. Rather, we think that
our three examples (2.1, 2.2, 2.3) provide an illustration of the type of situations, in which
similarity is useful in the process of reasoning about probabilities. In our current framework, it
might be natural to use the structure of the sets X and A to construct more speciﬁc similarity
functions. However, such a construction is reasonable only if the structure imposed on the sets
reﬂects the structure of payoffs, in other words, (x;a) pairs which are considered similar lead to
22"similar" probability distributions over outcom e s .I ti se a s yt oi m a g i n es i tuations, in which the
decision-maker ﬁrst has to ﬁnd out which of the characteristics of (x;a) are payoff-relevant (e.g.
for a child, drawing on a piece of paper and drawing on the wall might appear quite similar, until
it learnsthat it earnscompliments for the former, but reproach for the latter). Hence, the data-set
will provide not only information about the distribution of payoffs of a speciﬁc alternative, but
also about similarity between alternatives. The more observations it contains, the more precise
the perceptionof similaritywill bec om e .W ep la ntom od elt hi sad aptive process in a subsequent
paper.
Similarly to BGSS (2005), our approach relies on concepts which are not directly observable,
such as probability or similarity perceptions. Using the axiomatizations of the case-based de-
cision rule, as well as of decision-making rules under ambiguity present in the literature, it is
possible to extend the results of this paper so as to accommodate actual choices. We plan to
address this issue in our future research.
Appendix A. Proofs
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . 1:
It is obvious that the representation satisﬁes the axioms, hence we prove only the sufﬁciency of
t h ea x i o m sf o rt h er e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
Denote by Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 the set of rational probability vectors of dimension |C|.W em a k eu s e
of the following Proposition 3 from BGSS (2005, P. 1132), which we state in terms of our
notation:
Proposition 6.1 BGSS (2005)
Assume that h : Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 → ∆|R|−1 satisﬁes the conditions:
(i) for every f, f0 ∈ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 and every rational α ∈ (0;1),
h(αf +( 1− α)f
0)=λh(f)+( 1− λ)h(f
0),
for some λ ∈ (0;1) and
(ii) not all {h(f)}f∈Q
|C|
+ ∩∆|C|−1 are collinear.
Then there are probability vectors (ˆ p(c))c∈C ∈ ∆|R|−1 not all of which are collinear and posi-









The idea of the proof is as follows. First, we construct a sequence of sets consisting of ﬁnite
data-bases in such a way that the limit of this sequence is a set of inﬁnite data-bases D∞.
Moreover, we show that, for each vector f in the set Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1, D∞ contains a data-set,
which has f as its frequency, see Lemma 6.2. Hence, we can think of H as a mapping from
Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 to ∆|R|−1. In a second step (Lemmas 6.3, 6.4 and Corollary 6.5), using Axioms
(A2) and (A3),w es h o wt h a tH can be represented as a union of functions h, all of which
satisfy properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6.1 when restricted to D∞. Next, in Lemma 6.6,
we apply the construction used in the proof of Proposition 3 in BGSS (2005) to determine the
similarity function s for the restriction of each h to D∞. It is straightforward to show that the
similarity weights do not depend on h. The last step, Lemma 6.7, consists in using Axiom (A2)
to show that the same similarity weights can be used for data-sets of any length T ≥ 2.




|C|−1 | f (c)=
k
T
for some k ∈ {0;1...T} and for all c ∈ C
¾
.
Obviously, for each T, QT ⊂ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1.O u rﬁrst Lemma shows that we can approximate
Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 by QT by choosing a speciﬁc sequence of T’ s . W ed e n o t eb ylim (lim), the
inferior (superior) limit of a sequence of sets, (see BERGE (1963, P. 118) for deﬁnitions and
properties).






We will denote by D∞ the set of data-bases which give rise to the set Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1.






24Hence, we check that for each q ∈ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1, there exists an M ∈ Z+ such that for all








with ai and bi ∈ Z+, and take the largest of the numbers bi, b(q)=m a x i∈{1...|C|} bi.N o ws e t
M = b(q) and observe that for all m ≥ M, each ratio
ai





b(q)!(b(q)+1 )( b(q)+2 )...m
=
aiki





ki =( bi − 1)!(bi +1 )( bi +2 )...m.
Since ai ≤ bi, it follows that
0 ≤ aiki ≤ Tm
and obviously aiki ∈ Z+. which proves the claim.





This follows immediately from the fact that QTm ⊂ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 for all m ∈ Z+. Hence,





T h en e x tl e m m a6 . 3a l l o w su st or e l a t et h eConcatenation Axiom, (A2) (which is formulated in
terms of data-sets) to property (i) in Proposition 6.1 (stated in terms of frequencies).
Lemma 6.3 Let T ∈ Z+, f0, f00, f ∈ QT and suppose that there is an α ∈ (0;1) such that:
αf
0 +( 1− α)f
00 = f.
Denote by D =( f;T), D0 =( f0;T), D00 =( f00;T) the data-sets with length T and frequencies
f, f0 and f00. Then, there exists a λ ∈ (0;1) such that:
λH (D
0)+( 1− λ)H (D
00)=H (D).
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . 3 :





25Note that such integers m and n can be found as long as α is rational, which is satisﬁed since
f, f0 and f00 ∈ QT. Now note that:
D1 ◦ ... ◦ Dm =( D
0)
m
Dm+1 ◦ ... ◦ Dn =( D
00)
n−m
D1 ◦ ... ◦ Dn =( D)
n ,













µi = H (D).
Setting λ =
Pm
i=1 µi ∈ (0;1) concludes the proof.
For any T ≥ 2,l e tHT denote the restriction of H to DT.W en o ws t a t eal e m m aw h i c hs h o w s
that for every such T, we can express
HT : DT → ∆
|R|−1
a sac o l l e c t i o no fs i n g l eh ypotheses (functions)
hT : DT → ∆
|R|−1,
hT ∈ HT
which satisfy properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6.1.




hT : DT → ∆
|R|−1ª
such that for each T ≥ 2,
∪hT∈HThT (D)=HT (D)
and the following properties are satisﬁed:
(i0) whenever






for each hT ∈ HT,






26(ii0) not all vectors
{hT (D)}D∈DT
are collinear.
Before stating the proof of Lemma 6.4, we illustrate its implications by the following corollary:
Corollary 6.5 Each hT ∈ HT as constructed in Lemma 6.4 satisﬁes properties (i) and (ii)
stated in Proposition 6.1, where the set Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 is replaced by QT for T<∞.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y6 . 5 :
For a given T, each set D ∈ DT is uniquely identiﬁed by its frequency. Hence, property (ii0)
corresponds exactly to property (ii) from Proposition 6.1. To see the relation between (i0) and
(i) recall that Lemma 6.3 demonstrates that for every T ≥ 2,e v e r yD, D0, ˜ D ∈ DT with
frequencies f, f0, ˜ f ∈ QT (with Q∞ = Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1) and every rational α ∈ (0;1), such that
αf +( 1− α)f





= λHT (D)+( 1− λ)HT (D
0),





= λhT (D)+( 1− λ)hT (D
0).





= hT (αf +( 1− α)f)=λhT (f)+( 1− λ)hT (f
0).
Especially, for D∞,t h i se x p r e s s i o ni sv a l i df o ra n yt w of and f0 ∈ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 and every
rational α ∈ (0;1).
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . 4 :
First, we show that hT satisfying property (i0) exist. By the Caratheodory Theorem, see GREEN
AND HELLER (1981, P. 40), we know that for a convex set HT (D) in a ﬁnite dimensional
space (such as R|R|−1), each point of the set can be represented as a convex combination of at





are convex sets (polyhedra),






























i sab a s i so fDT, it follows that any linear combination of data-sets (written as (fD;|D| = T))













with λi ∈ (0;1), whenever ci occurs in D at least once. The Caratheodory Theorem now allows


































H e n c e ,w ec a ni d e n t i f ye a c hs e l e c t i o nhT with a vector of coefﬁcients (αij)
|C|| R|
i=1j=1. Property (i0)
will be satisﬁed if we take the maximal set of such selections, i.e.
∆
|C|×(|R|−1).
We will now consider only functions hT satisfying property (i0) and show that it is possible
to construct the set HT without violating property (ii0). In terms of the representation above,














are collinear. The claim is that in the set of selections as given by ∆|C|×(|R|−1),w ec a nﬁnd





D∈DT, such that for each ˆ D ∈ DT, h
ˆ D
T assumes the same







at last three of which are
non-collinear.
Suppose ﬁrst that HT satisﬁes the condition of (A3) for some (ci)
T, (cj)
T and (ck)
T,a l lo f







































must hold. Since these three vectors are not collinear by assumption, the result of the lemma
obtains for this case.






for m ∈ {i;j;k} have a non-empty interior. Take some set


























































, the result of the lemma



































































,( A - 1 )
and
λi i + λj j =0 .












for every m ∈ {i,j,k}.
Then, Axiom (A3) insures that not all of these points are collinear and, hence, the result of the
29lemma obtains.












,b u ta r en o t
extreme points for all m ∈ {i,j,k}. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h eh y p e r p l a n e s containing the sides










lie are not parallel. In that case, it is



























λi i + λj j =0
and, hence, the equality in A-1 obtains. (This can be done, e.g. by choosing  j to lie in the























exists by the assumption that the
two hyperplanes are not parallel).






lie are parallel, but at least two of them are distinct. Then choose vectors  i and  j
such that
λi i + λj j =0























If the three hyperplanes coincide, there are two possibilities: either at least one of the points

















, then, it is obviously possible to ﬁnd  i and  j





by  j along the edge to





in the opposite direction by the use
















into the exactly opposite direction by means of  j.
If at least two of the edges are not parallel, then the existence of  i and  j is obvious, as in the
case of non-parallel hyperplanes. If the edges are parallel but distinct lines in this hyperplane,
proceed as in the case of three parallel but distinct hyperplanes. If all of the lines containing the
edges coincide, then all vertices contained in these edges must be collinear, which is excluded
by (A3).
Lemma 6.6 Let D ∈ D∞. Then,
H∞(D)=
½P
c∈C s(c)ˆ p∞ (c)fD (c)
P
c∈C s(c)fD (c)




ˆ P∞ (c)=H ((c)
∞),
(and hence, satisfy Linear Independence)a n ds(c) are given by the unique (up to a multipli-














P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . 6 :
Obviously, the construction in Lemma 6.4 does not depend on T. Hence, for the sequence Tm
as deﬁned in Lemma 6.2, letting m →∞ , we can represent H∞ as a selection of functions
h∞ which satisfy all of the conditio n so fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . 1 .W ec a n ,t herefore, apply directly the
result of the proposition and state, for each h∞, the existence of unique vectors






















31Taking the union of all such vectors ˆ p, we thus obtain the sets
ˆ P∞(ci)=∪h∞∈H∞ = H∞ ((ci)
∞) for i ∈ {1...|C|}.
These sets trivially satisfy the conditions of Axiom (A3). We can now determine the similarity

























implies that this system has a unique solution, {s∞ ((ci))}
3
i=1. F o rt h ec a s eo f|C| > 3,w e
c a na p p l yS t e p2o ft h ep r o o fo fB G S S( 2 0 0 5 ) ,w h i c hi m p l i e st h a tn om a t t e rw h i c ht h r e e
non-collinear vectors are chosen, the resulting similarity functions differ only with respect to
a multiplication by a positive number. Lemma 6.4 insures that (λi)
|C|
i=1 r e m a i nt h es a m ef o ra l l
functions h.S i n c eˆ p∞ (ci)=h∞ ((ci)
∞) it follows that the unique (up to a multiplication by a
positive number) solution to this equation is does not depend of the chosen vector and is given
by:
s(ci)=λi. 
Lemma 6.7 For every T ≥ 2 and D ∈ DT,
HT (D)=
½P
c∈C s(c)ˆ pT (c)fD (c)
P
c∈C s(c)fD (c)










and s(c) are the unique (up to a multiplication by a positive number) solution of equation A-2.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . 7 :
First note that using the argument in the proof of Proposition 3 in BGSS (2005, P. 1134) we
32can show that the solution of the system:
T−1



























































is identical (up to a multiplication by a positive number) to the solution of equation A-2. Note
that this argument uses only properties (i) and (ii), but does not make use of the fact that h is
deﬁn e do nt h es e tQ
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1.
Let T<∞. Corollary 6.5 shows that properties (i) and (ii) stated in Proposition 6.1 are
satisﬁed for all ﬁnite data-sets with equal length T as long as the set of possible values of f and
f0 is restricted to QT.


















Note that, for i and j ∈ {1...|C|}we can write:
⎛













and conclude, by (A2) a n dL e m m a6 . 3t h a t
HT
⎛















for some λ ∈ (0;1).L e m m a6 . 4s h o w st h a tt h es a m ev a l u e so fλ can be used for each selection
hT of HT.A n d(A2) guarantees that for any k ∈ Z+,
⎛
















⎝ ci...ci | {z }
k(T−1)-times



















⎝ ci...ci | {z }
Tm(T−1)-times
;cj...cj | {z }
Tm-times
⎞
⎠ = λH∞ ((ci)
∞)+( 1− λ)H∞((cj)
∞)










for each selection h∞ ∈ H∞.
Hence, we can determine the similarity function for data-sets of length T by solving the system
of equations:
T−1

































































in which the λ-values are identical to those in equation A-3 above. Since the selections hT
satisfy properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6.1 restricted to QT and since the argument from
the proof of Proposition 3 in BGSS (2005) used above does not depend on the set QT,w ec a n
use it again to claim that the unique solution to this system coincides with the solution of A-3






holds. Hence, we can use the simila r i t yf u n c t i o nd e t e r m i n e df o rD∞,f o ra n yDT with T<∞.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 . 1 :






is given by fD (r). Consider
34the sequence of data-sets Dk as k →∞and note that by (A1),a sk →∞ ,
H (D
∞) → {h(D
∞)} = {fDk (r)} = {fD∞ (r)}.















Especially, for k =1 ,t h e r ei sa nh ∈ H (D) such that
hr (D)=fD (r). 
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 . 2 :






and setting for each selection h,
























(¯ x;¯ a). 






































for every T. Now consider all cases (xi;ai;r)r∈R and the data sets (xi;ai;r)
∞ w h i c ha s s i g na













































































































for all r, r0 ∈ R, which after normalization can be written as:
s((xi;ai);(xi;ai;r)) = 1
for all r ∈ R. 
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